On Red Turf, Standing Ground

Context: The recent Chhattisgarh ambush has triggered a fresh round of finger-pointing from predictable quarters of civil society and security experts. But the state is far from losing the war against Maoists

Post-incident analysis of Chhattisgarh attacks and issues within: Broadly speaking, the post-incident analysis of such setbacks comes in two flavours -

• Root cause and alienation approach: It focuses Failure of the state to provide economic development and social justice to the tribals and thus emphasises adopting a development-centric approach and negotiations. However, there are certain problems with this approach:
  • It does not take into account the Naxals rejection of India’s Constitution and democracy.
  • It fails to recognise that the social and economic deprivation is not confined to the jungles of Chattishgarh.
  • It doesn’t account for the possibility that while alienation and deprivation may help in igniting the spark of revolution, once lit, the flames draw oxygen from many sources.
  • The role of external forces in fomenting and sustaining this movement is deliberately underplayed.
  • It ignores the ground reality of the praxis of revolution.
  • It does not acknowledge the extensive ideological, financial and logistical ecosystem that provides sustenance to these revolutionaries.
• Poor quality of leadership: Tactical failures against the Maoists are entirely due to the poor quality of leadership provided by the IPS, and thus it is necessary to make the officers accountable- i.e. when there is a setback, identify the first IPS officer in the chain of command and hold him accountable.
  • Problem with this approach: It completely ignores the successes of IPS leadership in counterinsurgency operations in states like Punjab, Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Odisha, Northeast and J&K.

Way forward:

• Handling the public opinion: This is important because, in most cases, decision-makers are forced to disengage from a counter-insurgency by domestic public opinion and/or international pressure.
• Our forces in Chhattisgarh are not invading armies, and despite the full force of public opinion and faith in the legitimacy of their cause, still, Maoist sympathisers gain international attention through relentless propaganda against our security forces.
• Not just the politics, the geography and demography of the Naxal-affected areas make it an even more complex challenge of internal security.
• Thus, our public opinion is rightly reluctant to adopt a brute force strategy as the prime ingredient of a comprehensive solution.

Conclusion: Nevertheless, despite this tragic setback in Tekulagudem, the revolution has zero chance of success in India’s own long war.