Layers Of Counter-Insurgency

The Indian Express     9th April 2021     Save    

Context: While there is a decline in the Maoist insurgency, the recent attack on Tekulugudam Hill showcase that the decline could be a result of ‘tactical withdrawal’, which needs to be handled with an effective counter-insurgency strategy.

Key Strengths of Maoists:

  • Robust and efficient intelligence network.
  • Devolution of authority to local commanders.
  • Ability to quickly readjust their strategy.
  • Extensive support from local tribes and the ability to organise them into a tribal militia for short-term tactical purposes
  • Domination of the local landscape - They have mastered the art of exploiting the grey zone areas. The jungles around the interstate borders have always been the preferred hiding spaces for the Maoists.

Different Counter-insurgency (COIN) strategies: Employed so far -

  • People-centric approach: through “winning hearts and minds; is built on the notions of competitive state-building to address economic and governance deficiencies.
  • Enemy-centric approach:  The success of the state of Andhra Pradesh in curbing the Maoist problem is often attributed to this approach.
    • E.g. “Counter-guerrilla” tactics and jungle warfare was developed on the premise that Maoist guerrilla can only be countered by a state guerrilla.
  • A judicious mix of the enemy-centric and people-centric approaches: different forms of this mix-
    • E.g. Greyhounds in Andhra Pradesh also worked on short-gestation-period developmental works. 
    • Surrender and rehabilitation policies with sustained military pressure: As it was worked out in Andhra Pradesh and Odisha (after 2014 guidelines of the central government)
  • Negotiating with the insurgents: This approach will be suitable for Maoists, as they may not fall under the “worst” category, as successive governments have labelled them as “misguided” youth.

Way forward: An ideal COIN with the dual objective of defeating the insurgents militarily and fully quell the insurgent impulses.

  • Economic development: To mend conflict over the distribution of resources.
  • Cooperation between the states: States must do more to synergise their efforts by launching coordinated operations, thereby denying Maoists any space for manoeuvrability.
  • Improve the governance: Create a system where the tribal population feels that the government is representative, not repressive.
    • Opening negotiation channels and policies like surrender and rehabilitation, creating a system where the traditional elite does not control the distribution of power.
    • It is also important to segregate the population from the insurgents both operationally and ideologically.
    • It needs to be understood that Maoists are not treated on par with terrorists- as successive governments have labelled them as “misguided” youth.