What is in a NAM and India’s Alignment

The Hindu     9th September 2020     Save    
QEP Pocket Notes

Context: India has not yet found a universally accepted successor for Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as a signature tune for its foreign policy

Aims of Non Alignment

  • To retain the autonomy of policy from two politico-military blocs.: Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) provided a platform for newly independent developing nations to join together to protect this autonomy.
  • De-colonisation
  • Universal nuclear disarmament
  • Campaigns against apartheid.

Irrelevance of NAM in current times: 

  • Disbandment of blocs after the end of the Cold War
    • Freed from the shackles of the Cold War, the NAM countries were able to diversify their network of relationships across the erstwhile east­west divide. 
  • De-colonisation is largely complete
  • Apartheid regime in South Africa is dismantled
  • Campaign for universal nuclear disarmament has remained stagnant.

Issues with the Alternatives to NAM: While NAM is relegated to the background, other policies have been following challenges: 

    • Strategic autonomy: This has acquired a connotation similar to non-alignment, with an anti-U.S. stance.
  • Multi-alignment:  has not found universal fervour, as it may convey the impression of opportunism, whereas we seek strategic convergences.
  • Joining alliance with the US: This is on account of the China factor; however, the External Affairs Minister has clarified that India will not be joining any alliance system. Reasons being: - 
  • Dead concept: The fact is that ‘alliance’ is as much a Cold War concept as non-alignment.
  • Divergence in interests: The strategic interests of alliance partners are no longer congruent.
  • For, E.g. divergences within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) over the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.
  • Definitional dilemma: Alliances in the Asia-Pacific face a bigger definitional dilemma. Their current threat is from China as opposed to Russia in the past.

Imperatives of the Geography in deciding the future course of partnerships:

  • Economic and security interests in the Indo-Pacific space: have inspired - 
  • Act East policy of bilateral and multilateral engagements in Southeast Asia and East Asia and the Pacific.
  • Shared India-U.S. interests in dealing with the challenge from China in the maritime domain
  • The strategic importance of the continental landmass to its north and west:
  • Indian and U.S. perspectives are less convergent currently 
  • Connectivity and cooperation with Afghanistan and Central Asia need engagement with Iran and Russia, as well as with the Russia-China dynamics in the region.

Way Forward: 

  • Convergence between India-US: 
    • India’s development of trade routes through Iran would also serve U.S strategic interest of finding routes to Afghanistan and Central Asia, bypassing Pakistan and Russia, respectively.
    • The U.S. should pursue shared objectives with India to mutual benefit and accept that differences of perspectives will have to be addressed.
  • Convergence with Russia: 
    • A strong stake in relations with India could reinforce Russia’s reluctance (which still persists) to be a junior partner of China.
    • A close Russia­China partnership should move India to broad­base relations with Russia (beyond the traditional defence and energy pillars)
  • Designing a template of world order: India will acquire a larger global profile next year when it commences a two-year term on the UN Security Council. 
    • This template could have wider applicability for bilateral relations in today’s world order, which has been described as militarily unipolar, economically multipolar and politically confused.
QEP Pocket Notes