Context: The Anti-defection law is proving to be detrimental to legislatures' functioning in holding the executive accountable and imparting stability to government.
Issues with the Anti-defection Law:
Not limited to confidence or money bills (quasi-confidence motion): goes against the concept of Representative Democracy -
It applies to all votes, Bill, even applies to Rajya Sabha and Legislative Councils, which have no say in the government's stability.
Broken chain of accountability: legislators are made accountable primarily to the party.
This is opposed to Representative Democracy, where the legislator is accountable to voters, and the government is accountable to legislators.
Eroding position of legislatures: as the core role of an MP to examine and decide on a policy, Bills and budgets are sidelined, weakening the accountability mechanism.
Against the intention of framers of the Constitution: B R Ambedkar preferred accountability over stability.
Inducing instability by exploiting loopholes:
Members prefer to resign rather than vote against the party to overrule the question of defection. (which would cost them ministerial post otherwise)
Questionable role of Speaker: who has delayed decisions to retain the defected members
Supreme Court ruled that Speaker has to decide in three months, but not clear what would happen if a Speaker does not do so.
Based on flawed premise that the anti-defection law is needed to punish legislators who betray the mandate given by the voters.
However, many of the defectors in States such as Karnataka and Madhya Pradesh have been reelected in the bypolls (held due to their disqualification).
Way Forward:
Intra-Party reforms: If the stability of government is an issue due to people defecting from their parties, the answer is for parties to strengthen their internal system
They should attract members on the basis of ideology and must have systems for people to rise within the party hierarchy on their capabilities (rather than inheritance).