Grading India’s Counter-Coercive Strategy

The Hindu     9th January 2021     Save    

Context: In the context of the ongoing pandemic, as the two powers (China and the USA) engage in a strategy of exhaustion, middle powers such as India must see an opportunity to redefine their place in the world order.

Coercive diplomacy: defining the escalatory ladder

  • Four variants of coercive diplomacy: as defined by Alexander L. George, an American political scientist.
    1. A gradual turning of the screw.
    2. A try-and-see.
    3. A tacit ultimatum.
    4. A full-fledged ultimatum.
  • The psychological variables: that impact the effectiveness of coercion, particularly the dangers of misperceptions and miscalculations under the stressful conditions of crises.
  • Importance of political leaders: having a good understanding of adversary leaders, their mindsets and domestic constraints.

India’s traditional response strategies: when faced with adversaries who are either irrational or revisionist.

  • Status quo power: ingrained in India’s strategic DNA and associated strategies of deterrence and coercion.
  • India has often initially rocked onto back foot when faced with a crisis that involves either the application or the show of force.

Counter-Coercive strategy of India: Against Chinese unprovoked transgression (May 2020) in Eastern Ladakh

  • India’s try-and-see approach: involved building up forces to achieve parity on the ground and showing the capabilities of the Indian Air Force.
    • Aimed at restoring the status quo: Without an explicit threat or a time limit laid down by India.
    • Further complimented by coercive content in its diplomacy and economic posturing vis-à-vis China.
  • Following Kautilya & Sun Tzu’s approach towards statecraft: avoidance of war & winning without fighting
    • Chinese initial aggression and India’s response conformed to a predictable journey up the escalation ladder that stopped at a tacit ultimatum.
  • Winning the war of attrition: by performing their operational roles at high altitudes with ease, unlike Chinese expectations.
  • China ceding the psychological high ground: After Indian Army occupied key heights overlooking People’s Liberation Army positions.
  • Positives for Indian statecraft:
    • India has militarily recovered well, diplomatically played hard-ball and strategically postured deftly despite the constraints of the ongoing pandemic.
    • Synergised politico-diplomatic-military approach: by the Indians during negotiations have been a welcome departure from the past.

Conclusion: The kind of power asymmetry that exists between the two countries, it can only be fair to argue that India has done well in countering Chinese coercion in Ladakh with its own brand of counter-coercion.