China, Kashmir and the ghost of August 5

Context: India’s unilateral decision on the territorial status of J & K on August 5, 2019, and consequent handling of the current LAC crisis have aggravated the latent sensitivities of both Pakistan and China in the region.  

Critique of India’s unilateral actions and handling of conflict in Kashmir:

• In the context of India-Pakistan relations:

• Rise in violence in Kashmir: Official data confirm the rise in violence since 2014; Early trends in 2020 show that the levels of violence will indeed cross those in 2019.
• Undermined the Simla Agreement of 1972: due to unilateral decision making by India over Kashmir’s territoriality.

• It states that neither side shall unilaterally alter the situation, pending the final settlement.
• Territorial changes after 1949 and until 1971 could become null and void.
• End to the existing ceasefire agreement, as the latest ceasefire is a reiteration of 1971 ceasefire agreement, declared in 2003.

• In the context of Indo-China relations:

• Reasons for China’s unease: Strong official claim by India about Aksai Chin, which has been in Chinese control.

• Conflict of interest in the region:

• Strategic importance to India: Chinese aggression close to Eastern Ladakh could put a strain on its hold over Siachen glacier.
• China’s Stake: The region is important for the CPEC and its access to Central Asia, both being part of the “Belt and Road” strategy.

• Failed attempt to calm China: Foreign Minister's assurances about India’s stand were not able to calm China. The unilateral attempt has been challenged as unacceptable by China.

• Fallouts of India position after LAC stand-off:

• Misconstrued statements: PM’s statement showed rhetoric to calm Beijing, but was used by China to justify its position on the LAC.

• Emboldened China: now could take more border raids and land capture attempts.

• Brought Pakistan and China closer: 

• Both sides argue that India changed the status of J&K whose borders were still being negotiated.
• China’s entry as more powerful third party: China being a neutral party during 1990s and 2000s, now considers itself as an aggrieved party to the conflict. 

Way Forward: 

• Deal with them separately: Continue to weaken the China-Pakistan alliance by engaging China economically, multilaterally, and regionally.

• Decisions to be based on cold, clear-headed strategic assessment: rather than narrowly based on tactical and political considerations.