The Fall Of Kabul, The Future Of Regional Geopolitics

Context: The post-American power vacuum in the region will aid China and shape India’s strategic choices and behaviour.

Geopolitical implications of American withdrawal and the rise of Taliban in Afghanistan

  • A regional power vacuum in the Eurasian heartland: Aided by the US withdrawal from Afghanistan.
    • This has opened up opportunistic interventions - An axis of regional powers such as China, Pakistan, Russia, and the Taliban, have already started filling this power vacuum.
  • Shrink in American influence in the region: US might have to explore new ways of working with regional powers to stabilise the region.
  • Deepening Chinese footprint: China will further strengthen its efforts to bring every country in the region, except India, on the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative bandwagon.
  • A potential rise in terrorism and extremism: 
    • Nullified controls: US presence in Afghanistan, international pressure on Taliban and Financial Action Task Force worries in Pakistan had a relatively moderating effect on the region’s terror.
    • Little appetite for a regional approach to curbing terrorism: Neighbouring countries are busy making their own private deals with the Taliban to not host terror organisations targeting them.
    • Limited space for international organisations: International community may have no choice but to recognise the Taliban regime as UN Security Council members such as China and Russia are at the forefront of engaging with the Taliban.

Implications on India’s strategic interests

  • A potential fallout in India-China relations: 
    • In the wake of aggressive Chinese encirclement of India, China is likely to become less accommodative towards India, including on the Line of Actual Control.
    • Economically, sorry state of the post-COVID-19 Indian economy and dependence on Chinese imports will prepare the ground for China to further challenge India.
  • India’s ‘Mission Central Asia’ effectively laid to rest:
    • India’s diplomatic and civilian presence, as well as its civilian investments, will now be at the mercy of the Taliban, and to some extent, Pakistan.
    • If there is a concerted effort by China, Pakistan and the Taliban to erase Indian presence from Afghanistan, there is little India can do about it.
  • Indo-Pacific to be the strategic theatre: With little scope for India in north-western landmass, all focus is bound to shift more to the Indo-Pacific.
  • Moderation in India’s relation with smaller neighbours: India now will be incentivised to cultivate friendly relations with smaller neighbours to restrict China’s aggressive policies.
    • For E.g. India’s subdued response to junta on the coup and its widespread human rights violations in Myanmar is likely to continue.
  • India-Pakistan relations to seek stability: Even a ‘cold peace’ would be in India’s interest, meanwhile, Pakistan could focus its energies on consolidating its interests and gains in Afghanistan.

Conclusion: Lessons for India is clear. It will have to fight its own battles. So, it must make enemies wisely, choose friends carefully, rekindle flickering friendships, and make peace while it can.