Taliban 2.0 and the Afghan test

Context: Quiet satisfaction in Russia, China, Iran and Pakistan is tinged by worries about longer-term implications of the US’s retreat. If India is patient, opportunities could open up.

Challenges after the US’s withdrawal from Afghanistan

• Revival of Taliban: While the US has confirmed that 90 % of the withdrawal is done, the Taliban leadership has claimed that it is in control of 85 % of Afghan territory.
• If the Taliban is unwilling to accommodate the interests of all Afghans, it simply sets the stage for the next round of the civil war in Afghanistan.
• The Taliban is also signalling that it will not be a proxy for anyone else and will pursue independent policies.
• Divergent regional strategic perspectives: The idea of a regional solution to Afghanistan has always had much political appeal.
• Russia has not forgotten that the US had backed a jihadi insurgency against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s, which ended in Moscow’s humiliating military retreat.
• The US withdrawal from Afghanistan today also reinforces the strongly held conviction in China about the US’s  terminal decline and offers an alternative to the Western model of domestic and international governance.
• Iran has been locked in a confrontation with the US longer than either China or Russia.
• For Pakistan, it is a moment of geopolitical vindication in Afghanistan.
• India specific challenges: For India, the era of prolonged peace in Afghanistan secured by the US military presence has come to an end, and the Taliban could also begin to nurture anti-India terror groups. Three structural conditions will continue to shape India’s Afghan policy - 
• One is India’s lack of direct physical access to Afghanistan. This underlines the importance of Delhi having effective regional partners.
• Two, geography has given Pakistan the capability to destabilise any government in Afghanistan, but it does not have the power to construct a stable and legitimate order.
• Enduring contradictions between the interests of Afghanistan and Pakistan-- while many in Pakistan would like to turn Afghanistan into a protectorate, Afghans deeply value their independence.

Opportunities in Afghanistan

• Leveraging Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO): The SCO was launched 20 years ago by China and Russia to promote inner Asia stability.
• The current members of the SCO are China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and India. The SCO has four observer states — Iran, Afghanistan, Mongolia and Belarus.
• Neither Russia nor China would want to see Afghanistan becoming the nursery of international terror again under the Taliban.
• For China, potential Taliban support to the Xinjiang separatist groups is a major concern.
• Iran can’t ignore the Sunni extremism of the Taliban and its oppressive record in dealing with the Shia and Persian-speaking minorities.
• Pakistan worries about the danger of the conflict spilling over to the east of the Durand Line and hostile groups like the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) gaining sanctuaries in Afghanistan.

Conclusion: 

• For now, India must actively contribute to the SCO deliberations on Afghanistan but must temper its hopes for a collective regional solution. 
• At the same time, Delhi should focus on intensifying its engagement with various Afghan groups, including the Taliban, and finding effective regional partners to secure its interests in a changing Afghanistan.