India, Pakistan Need To Prioritise Nuclear Stability

Context: An overview of the likeliness of a nuclear enabled was between India and Pakistan.

Possibility of nuclear war between India and Pakistan:

• International concurrence:
  • A recent US intelligence overview considered a ‘general war’ between the two countries ‘unlikely’, although ‘heightened tensions’ has raised the risk of ‘conflict between the two nuclear-armed neighbours.
  • Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) provides comprehensive evidence: There exist grave deficiencies and asymmetries in the nuclear doctrines of India and Pakistan, which are compounded by mutual disbelief, existing and emerging military capabilities, and the prolonged absence of related dialogue mechanisms.
• Continues presence of nuclear weapons: With nuclear arsenal, necessity and proportionality, as cornerstones of the laws of war and civilised conduct outweigh claims of regional or cultural exceptionalism.
• Size differential: Strategic instability is to be expected, especially when there is a large size differential between two nuclear-armed countries, as in the case of India and Pakistan.
  • Doctrines of both the states suggest a scenario in which both sides could use nuclear weapons disproportionately (Despite India’s no-first-use commitments).
• Persistence of crisis triggers: In February 2019, tensions saw India and Pakistan make unprecedented use of airpower in each other’s territory.
• Fatigue in Confidence Building Measures (CBMs): Over a dozen past agreements remain in place, an often unsung achievement.
  • Moreover, CBMs have in-built limitations and chequered history in South Asia. Not one has been adopted in the pro-longed diplomatic lost decade since the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

Potential impact of a nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan

• Economically, the damage from nuclear use would likely be several times higher the current pandemic.
  • The UK, during the 2001-02 tensions, conservatively estimated at £20 billion the hit to its economy from nuclear use in South Asia.
• Risks of disruptions: Since India now discusses technology and supply chain resilience at the Quad high table, the future shared costs of disruption from mistaken use of nuclear weapons would be high.

Conclusion: Overall, these many challenges to nuclear deterrence stability do not mean that the proverbial next crisis between India and Pakistan, one major terrorist attack away, will necessarily hit the nuclear threshold. But they make it more likely that the situation may come close to it.