Hardly The India China Century Deng Envisioned

Context: For the current Chinese leadership, the 21st century is destined to be China’s alone, with India to be shown its place

Contentious issues in India-China relations

• Continuing territorial dispute: Both countries have over territorial claims over land controlled by the other.
• Political issues: Arising from India’s hospitality to Dalai Lama and China’s open support to its all-weather friend
• Breakdown of policy of side-stepping contentious issues post Galwan valley clashes in 2020: In the Galwan clash, the Chinese troops seem to have been engaged in a tactical move to advance their positions along areas of LAC that it covets, in order to threaten Indian positions and interdict patrols.
  • This led to clashes along borders and India-China relations are at their lowest ebb in living memory.
  • Chinese intentions are clear: China keeps saying the border should be left to future generations to settle, knowing full well that each passing year increases China’s relative economic, military and geopolitical strength vis-à-vis India, while shifting the LAC in its favour.
  • Strategic agenda: Border incidents to keep Indians off balance and demonstrate to the world that India is not capable of challenging China, let alone offering security to other nations.
  • India’s symbolic acts of economic retaliation: Banning Chinese apps in India, barring Chinese companies from lucrative opportunities in the vast Indian market (Huawei and ZTE in 5G infrastructure), limits on Chinese investment in projects such as railways, motorways, public-sector construction projects, and telecoms etc.
• India’s economic dependence on China: Especially for vital imports such as pharmaceuticals, and the active ingredients to make them, automotive parts and microchips etc.
  • Non-consumption economic dependence: That is, today, imports from China have become indispensable for India’s exports to the rest of the world.
  • Limits to effectiveness of India’s economic retaliation: As trade with China may seem substantial from an Indian perspective, but it only represents 3% of China’s exports.

Conclusion: The range of considerations seems to leave only two strategic options for India

• Reconciling itself to playing second fiddle to an assertive China in the region, which is indigestible for any democracy.
• Seeking strength and leverage by aligning itself with a broader international coalition against Chinese ambitions