A Multipolarity, Scripted By The Middle Powers

Context: Analysing different forces shaping the new world order and the critical role of middle powers (Japan, Iran, Turkey and India).

Forces shaping an emerging new world order

• US’s stance: The new Biden administration has chosen to follow Trump’s legacy. E.g.
  • US’s reluctance to re-join the nuclear agreement with Iran.
  • Prioritising “Indo-Pacific” as an area of strategic significance: showcased by Quad Summit in March 2021 and affirmed commitment to a “free, open, resilient and inclusive” Indo-Pacific region.
  • Possibility of New Cold War: the US continues to view China as its principal adversary and has called for like-minded nations to curb China’s growth, reduce its influence in international institutions, and “induce China to change in more creative and assertive ways”.
  • Continuing U.S.-Russia hostility: Stemming from Russia’s war with Ukraine and occupation of Crimea in 2014, followed by allegations of Russian cyber-interference in US presidential elections.
• Solidifying Russia-China relations: Expanding bilateral ties, mobilising vision of ‘Greater Eurasian Partnership’ under Eurasian Economic Union sponsored by Russia and China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
• Forming of a new geopolitical binary: Indo-Pacific versus Eurasia.

Role of middle powers (Japan, Iran, Turkey and India) in shaping the new world order

• Shaping alliances:
  • Japan-India: Deeply entrenched in Quad and have substantial security ties with the US. Japan has also instituted a $200 billion ‘Partnership for Quality Infrastructure that funds infrastructure projects in Asia and Africa.
  • Iran’s strategic comfort: With Sino-Russian alliance in the face of continuing US sanctions.
  • Divergence in Turkey: A NATO member, finding its interests better-served by Russia and China rather than the US and its European allies (due to the rise of New Ottomanism).
• Constraints in alliance:
  • Japan’s contrasting economic dependence on China and security dependence on the US: In 2019, 24% of Japanese imports came from China, while 19% of its exports went to China.
  • Vicious cycle of India-China relations:
    • India’s closeness with the US in intelligence sharing to counterweigh China’s regional dominance has failed to reduce Chinese territorial intrusions.
    • Thus, the ‘revenge of geography’ and concerns relat­ing to the US’s intrusive approach on human rights issues ensure that India will need to manage its ties with China on its own.
  • Quest for strategic independence from Iran: Stemming out of questions over long term alignment with the Sino-Russian axis.
  • Neo-Ottomanism in Turkey: Turkey still wishes to keep its ties with the US intact and retain the freedom to make choices.
    • E.g. Turkey’s New Asia initiative: Strengthening of east-west logistical and economic connectivity backed by western powers and China.

Conclusion: While the middle powers are currently reluctant, they have the potential to make multipolarity, rather than a new Cold War, the de?ning characteristic of the emerging global order.