Securing the future

The Indian Express     24th June 2020     Save    
QEP Pocket Notes

Context: Due to the unresolved nature of the Line of Actual Control (LoAC), the army must revisit strategies on northern borders to deal with repeated Chinese intrusions.

Analysing the Chinese Aggression: 

  • Centralised Army: The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) acts as an ultra-nationalistic actor under the Central Military Commission, unlike other democracies. 
  • Lack of outcomes: on border discussion between India and China despite multiple engagements. For E.g.
  • India and China had held meetings to discuss the disputes since 1981.
  • Meetings of Joint Working Groups from 1988 to 2005 
  • 22 rounds of Special Representatives talks and also Summit-level meetings. 
  • Leverage against India: The Chinese have deliberately ensured the nebulous nature of the LAC to undertake premeditated aggression at regular intervals. 
    • E.g. The intrusion at Finger 4/5 of Pangong Tso and the transgression up to LAC in Galwan.
  • Hegemonic ambition of China: Without any historical basis, the official Chinese statement said the entire estuary of Shyok and Galwan rivers belongs to them.
  • Lack of military ethics: demonstrated by the use of barbed wires and knuckle-duster during the recent border violence.

Way Forward

  • National unity and no politics on issues of national security. 
  • Boosting the confidence of the army: by not undermining the military decisions taken by troops and commanders, to boost the confidence of troops battling adversities at the LAC.
    • The unit at Galwan, 16 BIHAR, was well trained and had undertaken extensive winter patrolling and domination of the Depsang plateau.
  • Revisit rules of engagement: on the Northern Borders, because troops in tactical situations cannot be shackled by past treaties.
    • The Indian Army must be prepared to militarily handle the situations that will arise.
  • Revisiting management practices: for the northern borders 
    • For E.g. placing a division-sized force of ITBP in Eastern Ladakh under the army. 
  • Avoiding bureaucratic maze: Real-time intelligence, surveillance equipment, and satellite imageries must be made available to field formations without delay.
  • Need to strategize for the future: including the modern manifestations of non-contact, non-kinetic warfare.
  • Regular briefings at the political level: at representative forums like Parliament, the committees to seek clarifications.
  • Informing the nation: within the norms and constraints of national security, to avoid an information vacuum that leads to rumor-mongering.
QEP Pocket Notes