More Sabre-Rattling, more Isolation

Context: Chinese muscularity in South China Sea (SCS) is leading to a growing chorus of protest in the region.

The festering regional resentment against Chinese muscularity:

• Growing Chinese muscularity in the SCS: 

• Increased patrolling and live-fire exercising by Chinese naval vessels. 
• Ramming and sinking of fishing vessels of other claimant countries. 
• Building of runways, bunkers, and habitation on the atolls claimed by China.
• Chinese exploration and drilling vessels are competing aggressively in the disputed waters. 

• ASEAN’s strong response: to the growing Chinese footprint in the SCS at its recent Summit.

• Response from Indonesia:

• It protested to China about its vessels trespassing into its waters close to the Nantua islands. 
• Indonesia and the Philippines are in the early stages of exploring the procurement of the BrahMos missile from India.
• Japan is partially funding the upgradation of the Indonesian coast guard. 

• Response from Philippines:

• It protested to China about violations of Filipino sovereignty in the West Philippine Sea. 
• Extending the Visiting Forces Agreement with the U.S. for six months.
• It commissioned a beaching ramp on the Pag-Asa Island. 
• It is about to induct a missile-capable frigate from South Korea.

• Vietnam has added six Kilo-class, Russian-origin submarines to its navy. 
• Russia’s growing influence: in military and economic equities in the SCS. 

• Russia and Vietnam have committed to strengthening their defence cooperation relationship.
• Rosneft has been invited by the Philippines to conduct oil prospecting in its EEZ.

India needs to increase its presence in SCS:

• India’s stakes: The SCS carries merchandise to and from India. So India has a stake in the SCS, just as China has in the Indian Ocean.
• Defence diplomacy outreach: in the Indo-Pacific region.

• Increase military training and conduct exercises and exchanges.
• Extend Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief activities. 
• Share patrolling of the Malacca Strait with the littoral countries. 

• Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships: extended to Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore.
• Upgrading the military capacity: of the tri-service Andaman and Nicobar Command as they overlook Asia’s maritime strategic lifeline.