India’s continuing two-front conundrum

The Hindu 22nd June 2020 Save

Context: The mistakes of 1962 in dealing with the two geopolitical adversaries provides lessons to India, which continues to face the two-front conundrum.

Mistakes made in the past

Letting the guard down: India paid the price for forgetting about its two antagonists, conversely, whenever it took account of the same, it has done well.

In 1962, J. Nehru and V.K. Menon believed that the principal threat came from Pakistan.

In 1971, Indira Gandhi took account of possible Chinese support to Pakistan and took out an insurance policy in the form of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the Soviets.

Blind-sided foreign and security policy:

As the Wuhan and Mamallapuram Summits resulted in diffused standoffs between India-China (Depsang, Chumar, and Doklam)

Obsession with Pakistan and Complacency with China:

India has demonstrated friendliness without reciprocity and firmness without force while interacting with China.
V.K. Menon had an immutable belief that Pakistan was a threat, not China.
Unaware J. Nehru: about Army General’s warning, of incapability to sustain an entire operation across the entirety of the India-China border.
Acknowledged in parliament that India’s defense dispositions “were based on our unfortunate position vis a vis Pakistan”.

Predicating security interests on personal predilections: misled by the good equation developed with Premier Zhou En-lai.

Krishna Menon reassured Chief of Army Staff, before the war, that Chinese Deputy Premier has told him China would never fight over border issues.

China’s march to dominance:

Started with India becoming the object of Chinese aggression:

J. Nehru wrote to U.S President Kennedy, 1964: China was making a bid for leadership, not just Asia, but “as the first step in their bid for world leadership”