The Ladakh Warning

Context: India needs to be more strategically active to defend its territorial claims and safeguard its security infrastructure from aggressive Chinese intrusions.

India’s Differing Perception Theory of the Line of Actual Control (LAC)

• China’s strategic interest is not limited to LAC: it has also raised objection over the abrogation of Article 370 and 35A, which recognises Ladakh as a Union Territory (UT). 

• India dismissed China’s accusations: of the Indian Army crossing the Line of Actual Control (LCA) and blamed China for intruding into the Indian side of the LAC, and disrupting normal patrolling, and destroying posts and bridges on the Galwan Nala at Chang-Chenmo.

What Provoked Chinese Encroachment?

• India’s Reactivation of the world’s highest landing strips in 2008. 
• Reopening of Fukche and Nyoma airbases.
• India’s construction activities (Shayok-DBO road construction probably triggered the Galwan stand-off).
• Area-denial for patrolling at Sirijap. 
• Intrusions are part of China’s never-ending effort to push Indian troops westward of the Indus and Shyok rivers and reach the 1960 claimed line.

Chinese Claims and Disputed Regions 

• Out of the 857 sq. km. long border in Ladakh, only 368 sq. km. is the International Border and the rest of the 489 sq. km. is the LAC.
• Traditional disputed points: Trig Heights and Demchok.
• Fresh disputed points: Pangong Tso and at Chumur. 
• The old dispute sites were at the endpoint of Pangong Tso and at Chushul: the 1962 battle-site.
• The Sirijap range 
• South in Demchok, China claims some 150 sq km.
• In Chumur, China wants a straight border to bring Tible Mane (stupa) area under its control.

Chinese Aggressive and Strategic  Moves

• Road networks and massive infrastructure prevent patrolling by Indian troops.
• Tibetan nomads pitch tents on Hemis Monastery’s land throughout 2018-2019.
• Demanded removal of India’s fortified positions in Burtse (2013) and Demchok and Chumur (2014) for its retreat.
• The three-pronged strategy of attacking from Sirijap in the north, Chuchul in the south and through the lake water from the middle is the key chokepoint from where the Chinese can cut off Indian access to the entire flank of Chip Chap plains, Aksai Chin in the east and Shayok Valley to the north, 

• It means that Indian control is pushed to the west of the Shyok river and south of the Indus river, forcing India to accept both rivers as natural boundaries.

India’s Strategic Disadvantage

• China’s control of the southern side of the Karakoram (can ease access to Siachen Glacier) could make Nubra valley vulnerable and impact India’s hold over Siachen.
• China’s access to Changla-pass through Lukung and Tangtse would threaten the entire Indus Valley.
• China is eyeing the waters of the Shyok, Galwan and Chang-Chenmo rivers, to divert them to the arid Aksai Chin and its Ali region.
• Chumur is critical for the safety of the Manali-Leh route.